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A LOGICIAN’S SIDELONG GLANCE AT IRONY
1.
In Irony as Expression (of a Sense of the Absurd), Mitchell Green is pre-
senting an interesting account of communicative irony where “we ex-
press a sense of a situation’s absurdity (wackiness, goofiness, etc.)”
(Green 2017, p. 18). In this line of argument, he is questioning the
adequateness of irony as meaning-inversion and irony as conversational
implicature.
In this note, we would like to take the idea of absurdity a little bit
further, considering it in its logical sense. As a consequence we can offer
a possibility to defend, at least partially, irony as meaning-inversion and
conversational implicature.
Absurdity is used in logic as a propositional constant representing
the unconditionally false sentence, usually denoted by the symbol ⊥.
In some logics, this constant is taken as primitive and the negation of a
sentenceφ, for instance, can be defined in terms of absurdity by¬φ :⇔
φ→⊥.1
Our working hypothesis for a logical analysis of irony is the follow-
ing:
(?) An ironic statementφ, placed in the proper formal representation
of the given situation, will lead to the derivability of a contradic-
tion, i.e., absurdity.
TITLE 2
This is a working hypothesis only, as it is not yet properly worked
out. A fully-fledged theory for it would require some specifications
about formal representations of a situation and derivability which are
far from being straightforward. In particular, we will need to refine the
notion of “situation”, to make the hypothesis work in more interesting
examples.
We believe, however, that our hypothesis has some inherent plausi-
bility which comes from the supposed reaction of a listener: listing to
an ironic statement, the listener should usually react by thinking some-
thing like: “this is absurd.” Presupposing that the speaker has consis-
tent convictions, one continues to conclude: “(s)he cannot mean this
seriously; thus, (s)he must mean this ironically.” This line of argument
may apply to all examples where the listener is able to “derive” a con-
tradiction from the assumed “knowledge base” of the utterer and the
ironic statement.2
In this perspective, irony as meaning-inversion comes nearly by def-
inition: to logically cause absurdity, the ironic statement has to contra-
dict the speaker’s “knowledge base” or, equivalently, the speaker has to
believe the negation of the ironic statement.3 In some sense, we have
inverted here Green’s perspective, putting absurdity at the beginning of
the analysis of irony, and not at the end.
But Green correctly points to examples where the speaker clearly
does not believe in the negation of the ironic statement, like in exam-
ple (4), “You sure know a lot about baseball!” (Green 2017, p. 6). Irony
as meaning-negation fails here, if absurdity would have to be obtained
by assuming that the other person would not be knowledgeable about
baseball. We can, however, obtain absurdity by another—somehow
“second-order”—argument. Assuming Grice’s Maxim of Quantity, state-
ment (4) gives—in the situation described by Green—somehow more
information than needed: to know a lot about baseball is not to be de-
rived from baseball trivia. Thus, we obtain a contradiction, not with
any fact about a person’s knowledge about baseball, but with a gen-
erally assumed maxim in a conversational discourse. In this form of
“higher-type irony” the listener would have to reason as follows: “this
statement contradicts the Maxim of Quantity; thus, it has to be meant
ironically.” In fact, one could also argue that (4) violates the Maxim of
Relevance, because it appears to be neither relevant nor pertinent.
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While this reasoning is quite different from the case of irony as
meaning-negation, it still involves the derivability of a contradiction.
As this contradiction involves a conversational maxim, we see this as a
possible instance of irony as conversational implicature. But we should
add that here irony as conversational implicature works differently than
for Grice. His example, concerning “X is a fine friend” ((Grice 1989,
p. 34) and (Green 2017, p. 8)) would still be subsumed under irony
as meaning-negation, as it is “derivable” in the given situation that X
is not (any longer) a fine friend of A. In contrast, irony as conversa-
tional implicature serves in our account to derive a contradiction with
the conversational maxims rather than with the factual situation.4
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Notes
1See, for instance, (Troelstra & Schwichtenberg 2000, p. 3).
2Consider, for example, the “great fiddling” example (2) (Green 2017, p. 5). In this
particular case, the performer might not be able to derive the contradiction as he doesn’t
know the standards of musicality of the utterer.
3Formally, this would follow only if one assumes beliefs to be deductively closed, which
seems to be a too strong assumption (Kahle (2002)). However, in case the speaker in-
tentionally makes an ironic statement (s)he clearly will count on the negation to make
absurdity derivable.
4One may, however, subsume irony as meaning-negation under a special case of our
understanding of irony as conversational implicature: the utterance of a statement, con-
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